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INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 1969, police raided the Stonewall Inn1, a gay bar
in New York’s Greenwich Village, sparking riots that are widely seen
as giving birth to the modern gay rights movement.2 But the gay rights
movement did not immediately take root within the law or the courts.

* J.D., May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW; B.A., Political Science and Economics,
Loyola University Chicago, 2008.
1
With very few public gathering places for gays and lesbians at the time, the
unwarranted police riots showcased the dislike, hate, and negative sentiments
towards gays and lesbians. The riots proved the need for activism, for mutual
coexistence, and for the fight to eradicate homophobia.
2
Kenneth J. Bartschi, The Two Faces of Rational Basis Review and the
Implications for Marriage Equality, 48 FAM. L.Q. 471, 474 (2014), (citing Sherry
Wolf, Stonewall: The Birth of Gay Power-An Excerpt from Sherry Wolf's Book,
SEXUALITY AND SOCIALISM, INT’L SOCIALIST REV., http://
isreview.org/issue/63/stonewall-birthgay-power).
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The 1970s were filled with unsuccessful same-sex marriage cases,3
despite the fact that in 1967 the Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia,
redefined marriage as an important individual right by striking down
the ban on interracial marriage.4 In Loving, the Court held that “[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”5 and
described marriage as “one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’
fundamental to our very existence and survival.’”6 However, for more
than thirty-five years after Loving, not a single state permitted partners
of the same-sex to exercise the “vital personal right” and “basic civil
right” to marry until 2003.7
The issue of whether to allow same-sex marriage has many
different facets and has created a very important cultural debate
throughout the country.8 Public opinion has been shaped by two
polarizing views.9 One view sees what some state courts have done in
striking down same-sex marriage bans as correcting yet another
vestige of entrenched discrimination against a politically unpopular
and relatively powerless group in society.10 Yet, the opposing view
3

See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
4
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
5
Id.
6
Frank Gulino, A Match Made in Albany: The Uneasy Wedding of Marriage
Equality and Religious Liberty, 84-JAN N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 38-39 (2012).
7
Id. at 39; see Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (1993). The Supreme Court of
Hawaii struck down same-sex marriage bans because they discriminate against
individuals on the basis of their sex. Unfortunately, through voter initiative, samesex marriages were subsequently banned.
8
Vincent Samar, Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage versus
Unions, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 783, 783 (2005), (citing Kathleen Harris, Tory’s AntiGay Rant “Venomous”, The Toronto Sun, May 9, 2003, at 12; Keith B. Richburg,
Gay Marriage Becomes Routine for Dutch Two Years After Enacting Law, Up to
8% of Weddings Are Same-Sex Unions, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 2003, at A20).
9
Id. at 783.
10
Id. (citing Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.
2004)).
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finds such bans necessary to defend marriage as a relationship between
one man and one woman from a pernicious and immoral attack from
outside the institution.11 For these individuals, marriage is a religious
institution that informs their notions of family and intimacy.12 With
contrasting perspectives on marriage, it has been difficult to recognize
same-sex marriage.13 For years, the courts had fallen into step with the
cultural and social expectations of the American public, and had
upheld these normative perspectives on marriage.
Questions of the permissibility, legality, and the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage is still being determined today
in this country, and only recently has the jurisprudence on the topic
begun taking note of its inadequacy. In the last fifteen years, courts
and legislatures have responded more actively to the challenges, but
the results have been inconsistent. Same-sex marriage has been
permitted, overturned, and flat out banned across the country.
Needless to say, the path to same-sex marriage has been long, rocky,
and neither easy nor inevitable.14
Since the United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Windsor, struck down the core provision of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) on June 26, 201315 it has become clear that there has
been a significant shift in the acceptance of same-sex marriage across
the nation. To date, there have been sixty-five same-sex marriage
victories across the country.16 Of the twelve federal circuits, the Tenth,
Fourth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits have affirmed district court
11

Id. at 784.
Id. (citing Michael Massing, Bishop Lee's Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004,
§ 6, at 34 ((discussing the uproar within the Episcopal Church over the decision to
confirm as bishop an openly gay man, who is in a committed same-sex
relationship)).
13
Id.
14
Gulino, supra note 8, at 38.
15
28 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage as between one
man and one woman.
16
Freedom to Marry, an organization in favor of marriage equality has a chart
of litigation by state. Freedom to Marry, Marriage Rulings in the Courts (Mar. 2,
2015), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts
12
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decisions in favor of successful challenges against state constitutional
amendments or statutes barring recognition of same-sex marriage.
Winning arguments against same-sex marriage bans have successfully
argued that the bans violate the federal constitutional guarantees of
Equal Protection and Due Process, or both.17 Despite these successes,
the Sixth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage bans in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, causing a
circuit split.18 As of the date of publication19 there are thirteen states
in the United States, including Puerto Rico, that have not recognized
same-sex marriage.20
On September 4, 2014, in the consolidated federal district
cases of Wolf v. Walker and Baskin v. Bogan, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit weighed in on the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage bans and the failure to recognize valid, out-ofstate same-sex marriages.21 In a scathing, unanimous opinion from
Judge Richard Posner, the court struck down discriminatory same-sex
marriage bans in Indiana and Wisconsin.22 The court found that “the
grounds advanced by Indiana and Wisconsin for their discriminatory
policies are not only conjectural; [but] . . . totally implausible.”23
This Comment analyzes the legal rationale for the Court’s
decision. Given the Seventh Circuit’s decision, it signals that the
nation is ready for marriage equality for gays and lesbians. While the
Seventh Circuit’s decision achieves marriage equality, it also is the
first step in shaping the arena for additional legal battles over what
legal status sexual orientation should have in constitutional law and
whether the fundamental right to marry should be available to all.

17

Richard Roane, et al., Marriage Equality Update, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW 123, 130 (2014).
18
Freedom to Marry, supra note 19.
19
June 23, 2015.
20
Freedom to Marry, supra note 19.
21
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
22
Id. at 672.
23
Id.
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The deferential rational basis standard of constitutional review
that the Seventh Circuit used does not explicitly set forth sexual
orientation as a protected status deserving of strict or heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees. This failure stunts the
development of increased protections for LGBT individuals in these
future challenges because rational basis review is highly deferential to
the state, as long as the state has any rational reason for the
discriminatory statute. On the other hand, despite the reliance on
rational basis review, Judge Posner’s detailed analysis of a framework
using heightened scrutiny leaves the door open for expansion in this
area of law. In effect, proponents can use the decision to argue for a
broader interpretation of what constitutional standard applies, just as
proponents have done with the elusive Windsor case.
Further, the Seventh Circuit completely dismissed an analysis
of whether the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the
due process prong of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit
found it irrelevant, or a conversation for another time. This is most
likely due to the fact that the implications of creating fundamental
rights are heavier than retroactively deciding that statutes are
discriminatory or contrary to public policy, as they would be
determined, using equal protection principles. As will be seen infra24,
the development of whether marriage is a fundamental right has
effectively been halted.
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit determined that the sex
discrimination argument in the context of same-sex marriage is
untenable. The legal basis and justifications for these decisions are
fully analyzed infra25 along with the ramifications on the development
of LGBT civil liberties.
One thing is clear, that without expanding protections to
include sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the right
to marry as a fundamental right equally applicable to all, or even, sex
discrimination to apply in cases challenging statutes against gays and
lesbians, the law leaves large loopholes for discrimination in the future
24
25

See discussion in this Comment in Section II, A.
See discussion in this Comment in Section V.C.
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against the LGBT community. Take for example the most recent
dispute brewing within the Seventh Circuit—in Indiana. After the
Seventh Circuit struck down marriage bans, disagreements between
religious advocates and LGBT civil activists have grown. The groups
are fighting over questions of whether stronger protections for the free
exercise of religion could have an effect on eradicating or
extinguishing some of the recent gains in protections for the LGBT
community. For reasons more fully explored infra26, these
disagreements highlight the balancing that courts will have to do when
resolving conflicts between constitutionally protected religious
expression deserving of strict scrutiny and the burgeoning
constitutional protections for the LGBT community, primary
protection under the guise of “heightened” scrutiny for sexual
orientation discrimination.
In summation, the Comment explores the development of the
law from the day the police officers stormed into Stonewall Inn, to the
most recent implications of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Baskin v.
Bogan. The first part of the Comment gives a comprehensive analysis
of the right to marry as a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy
right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, the Comment connects
these legal principles with the developed case law over the last twentyfive years. The Comment offers the same analysis considering the
equal protection arguments, what they are, and how they have
developed in the law. The third part will interpret the recent same-sex
marriage case as it rose up from the Indiana and Wisconsin District
Courts to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and its legal ramifications and impact on future developments
for LGBT civil rights. Lastly, the Comment concludes with an
optimistic view of the future development of LGBT civil rights, but
leaves the reader with a stern warning of the work that remains ahead.

26

See the Conclusion in this Comment.
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WHAT IS MARRIAGE?

A. Societal and Normative Perspectives
“[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Because it fulfills
yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that
express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed
institution and the decision whether and who to marry is
among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”27
Legally speaking, the justifications for marriage have always
centered on the “preservation of property, rearing of children,” and
“financial stability.”28 Marriage affords its participants certain civil
privileges and a status rich in entitlements29 that, generally speaking,
are not afforded to individuals who remain outside the institution.
Irrespective of these important civil privileges individuals tend to enter
the institution of marriage as a reflection of the partners’ mutual love,
in spite of the legal benefits. 30
Outside of its legal purpose and meaning, marriage can be
conceived as a practice where the individual participants engage in an
obviously complex form of socially cooperative human activities
where the aim is to make possible for both spouses, opportunities to
enhance each other, their mutual benefits and psychological well
being.31 This occurs through the joint cooperation married partners
put towards achieving certain family, economic, or social goals—like
27

Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The regulation of
contraceptive use by married couples violated the right to marital privacy.
28
REV. GREGORY DELL ET AL., Session One: Social, Cultural and
Philosophical Issues, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 15-16 (2000).
29
Id.
30
Vincent Samar, Privacy and the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage Versus
Unions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 783, 791 (2005).
31
Vincent Samar, Privacy and Same-Sex Marriage: The Case for Treating
Same-Sex Marriage as a Human Right, 68 MONT. L. REV. 335, 345 (2007).
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whether to raise children, what employment opportunities to pursue,
and how to aid each other’s efforts to achieve individual goals.32
Further, when partners enter into marriage, the relationship
creates both intimacy and identity for the partners.33 Partners assume a
new ontological identity.34They see themselves as “us” rather than
“me,” just as they see property as “ours” rather than “mine”.35 For
partners, it creates a collective unit operating for their mutual benefit,
and it binds them to the shared larger institution of marriage, where
other married partners also belong.36
Because of what results from this special marital relationship,37
“the institution of marriage has the effect of enhancing each partner’s
. . . individual freedom in the ultimate pursuit of happiness and
liberty.”38 In a sense, the “marital relationship becomes more than just
. . . rights and benefits . . . for the relationship itself is . . . an end of
worthy pursuit.”39 It creates a sense of permanency by embodying a
socially recognized set of commitments and a public attestation to the
significance of these commitments. The partners affirm their mutual
commitment to benefit each other, and “the public, in turn, see[s] that
act as a positive good . . . which was not entered into lightly.”40 That is
the intangible social meaning of marriage generally makes the “value
of a committed partner . . . incalculable.”41
The marital relationship is a publicly recognized expression of
mutual love and is an integral part of each individual’s dignity and
32

Id. at 353.
Id. at 344.
34
Id. at 344.
35
Id. at 345.
36
Samar, supra note 28, at 792.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. (citing William Eskridge, The Case For Same-Sex Marriage: From
Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment 74 (1996)(discussing the value of
committed partnerships when one partner has AIDS)).
33
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self-worth.42 Marriage means providing for each other in a sense that
each is not alone in confronting life’s joys and difficulties on an
ongoing, semi-permanent basis.43
Marriage, from this perspective, is a unique human right
fulfilling a significant route to human self-fulfillment by allowing the
parties to a marriage to achieve an identity that significantly adds to
their own individual human dignity.44 Thus, to not recognize that right,
even in the context of same-sex couples, is to deny an important
avenue of human self-fulfillment that is a foundation of human rights
in general.45
Society tends to agree, and the law tends to support, that
marriage is a positive good to the individuals who participate in it.46
“If the marital relationship bestows so many benefits not only to
society, but to individuals, then the denial of the right to legally marry
a same-sex partner, represents a detriment to all those who would be
served by marriage but because of their sexual orientation, over which
they have no choice, and law . . . cannot participate.”47
B. Legal Marriage—What Type of Right?
Marriage has historically been an institution recognized and
regulated at the state level.48 States have generally regulated marriage
as a way to protect the public interest, protect the nuclear family and
ensure that children are not wardens of the state.
For this reason, the development of same-sex marriage
jurisprudence first took root at the state level, starting with the 1993
42

Samar, supra note 29 at 353.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 347. Human rights like liberty, privacy, freedom of association, pursuit
of happiness, etc.
46
Id. at 355.
47
Id.
48
Justin Reinheimer, Same-Sex Marriage Through the Equal Protection
Clause: A Gender-Conscious Analysis, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 213, 215
(2006).
43
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case of Baehr v. Lewin in Hawaii. There, the court held that same-sex
marriage bans constituted sex discrimination under the law.49 But
Baehr created controversy as opposition to same-sex marriage rose,
and through legislative acts and a ballot initiative, same-sex marriage
was banned yet again. At the same time, Congress enacted the Defense
of Marriage Act, or better known as, DOMA.50 These events lead
thirty states to amend their constitutions to create “mini-Domas” in
order to prohibit same-sex marriage and the recognition of such
marriages.51 From this point on, the case law is replete with state
courts and legislatures grappling with whether to extend marital rights
to same-sex couples and under what legal theory to recognize such a
right.52
However, marriage has also been understood to implicate
rights and freedoms enshrined at the federal level in the United States
Constitution.53 Hence, proponents of same-sex marriage have crafted
legal arguments claiming primarily that prohibitions on same-sex
marriage violate protected constitutional due process, privacy, and
equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment.54
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”55 The concepts of
“due process” and “equal protection guarantees” are two separate
constitutional protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.56
These constitutional provisions are applicable at the state level through
49

Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 530 (1993). Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples was sex discrimination under the
state constitution. Before the law could change, voters amended the constitution to
permit the legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples only.
50
28 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
51
Freedom to Marry, supra note 19.
52
Id.
53
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2719 (2006).
54
Reinheimer, supra note 45, at 216.
55
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
56
Id.
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the Fifth Amendment.57 Due process references the first clause and
equal protection references the second clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Due process is intended to safeguard certain critical or
fundamental rights for everyone, while equal protection shields a
particular set of social groups from discrimination.58 Put more
succinctly, due process protects the “whats” and equal protection the
“whos”.59
In the context of same-sex marriage litigation, proponents of
marriage equality set forth due process arguments alleging that there is
a constitutionally protected, fundamental right to marry the person of
one’s choosing, regardless of the sex of that person. The argument
seeks to include same-sex marriage in an inviolable sphere of safety in
which everyone can make choices about their lives and identities
without state intrusion, punishment, or constraint.60 Equal protection
challenges, on the other hand, object to the sex-based classifications
employed by same-sex marriage prohibitions, i.e., men cannot marry
men because they are men, and women cannot marry women because
they are women.61 A second equal protection argument alleges that the
same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of one’s sexual
orientation, specifically targeting gays and lesbians because of their
sexual preferences.62
Despite the constitutional protections afforded to fundamental
rights or protected groups, these protections can be restricted or
limited in scope by the state because at times an individual’s
constitutionally protected rights might come in direct conflict with the
state’s interest in protecting the public interest. For example, the state
is tasked with ensuring safety and education, protecting offspring and
57

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of
Gay Rights, 100 Va. L. Rev. 817, 818 (2014) (citing Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua
Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: Minimalism, Equality, and Federalism in the Struggle
for Same-Sex Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 199, 204 (2013)).
59
Id.
60
Reinheimer, supra note 45, at 217.
61
Id.
62
Id.
58
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property rights, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.63 Since
the state has these interests, the state is authorized to pass legislation
or laws in order to regulate these and various areas, but occasionally,
questions arise on whether the state has overstepped its bounds and
has infringed too much upon the constitutionally protected rights of a
group or individual. In those cases, the courts are called upon to
determine whether a statute or law as construed and applied,
constitutes proper exercise of police power or whether it has
unconstitutionally violated one of the liberty rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.64 The established doctrine is that this liberty
may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, by legislative action that is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within competency of the state to effect.65
Therefore, depending on the right at stake, or the group of
individuals it affects, the judiciary will apply a corresponding level of
constitutional scrutiny to determine if a statute has gone too far. The
three traditional tiers of constitutional scrutiny include: strict scrutiny,
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, and rational basis review. 66 Strict
scrutiny is applied to any deprivation of constitutional rights, including
fundamental rights, and classifications based on race, alienage, or
national origin.67 This requires the law in question to be “narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.”68 Under
intermediate scrutiny, applicable to classifications based on sex or
being born out-of-wedlock, the challenged law must be “substantially
related to an important government purpose.”69 Both strict and
intermediate scrutiny require the government or state to defend the law

63

Meyer v. Nebraska, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1923).
Id. at 626.
65
Id.
66
Bartschi, supra note 2, at 477.
67
Id.
68
Id. (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)).
69
Id. (citing City of Cleburne Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444
(1985)).
64
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and forces the state to limit the law’s reach to the actual justifications
for why the law was enacted.70
With traditional rational basis review, the most deferential
standard to the state, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.”71 The state need not articulate its reasons
or provide empirical evidence, leaving the challengers with the burden
“to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.”72
Therefore, the framing of the legal issue is integral to how
much power the state has in issuing same-sex marriage bans and the
probability of marriage equality proponents of achieving a favorable
decision. If one is to assume that same-sex marriage bans do not
infringe upon any constitutionally protected rights or discriminate
against any protected group of people, then the state only has to
provide a rational reason for why same-sex marriage is banned—i.e.,
the preservation of traditional marriage. On the contrary, if same-sex
marriage bans are believed to infringe upon constitutionally protected
rights or a protected class, then the justification for the state’s samesex marriage ban has to meet a tougher constitutional standard of
review. Under heightened or strict scrutiny same-sex marriage bans
must further an important state interest by means that are substantially
related to that interest or that same-sex marriage bans must serve a
compelling state interest and the bans are narrowly tailored in
achieving that stated goal under strict scrutiny.

70

Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)) (“The burden
of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State . . . . The justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”)
71
Id. (citing City of Cleburne Tex., 473 U.S. at 440).
72
Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)).
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II. The Development of the Law Surrounding Same-Sex
Marriage Litigation
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
To reiterate, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without the due process of law.”73 At first glance,
“life, liberty and property” seem like concrete ideas. Delving a little
deeper, it becomes apparent that they are rather abstract concepts.
Take for example, “liberty”. Other than its plain, literal meaning of
freedom from physical restraint, the law had to develop and define
“liberty”. Liberty as a definable right first began to take shape in
scholarly writing and through the judicial process. As courts began
defining liberty, they began to understand that liberty encompasses
necessary fundamental rights that must be constitutionally protected,
but with this declaration a second question arises, “what rights are
fundamental?” or “what makes a right fundamental?”
Adding to the discussion, courts determined, that the purpose
of the Due Process Clause is to “protect[ ] those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . .
.”74 Because such rights are so important, “an individual's fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote.”75 In simpler terms, the Due
Process Clause provides substantial protections to the individual from
state intervention and infringement on those rights perceived to be
inalienable or integral to fairness, justice, and liberty.
As abstract as the concept of liberty is, a list of enumerated
fundamental rights is just as elusive from the Constitution. But how
did the courts determine what rights should rise to the level of a
fundamental right? In order to answer that question, the courts first
sought to understand what is implicit in liberty and how do you
73

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
75
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
74

261
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/3

14

Drake: The Twenty-Five-Year Struggle for Marriage Equality: What Impact

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

achieve or protect it? To that end, courts have answered that in order
for man to have liberty, as a necessary corollary, he also must have
privacy. The conceptualization that liberty is intrinsically tied to the
right of privacy is a very important realization for the development of
fundamental rights, especially in the context of same-sex marriage.
Already strongly rooted in the Fourth Amendment76 and in tort
law,77 privacy as a unique fundamental right was finally articulated by
the Supreme Court in 1965 in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut.78
Thus, liberty embraces a fundamental right to privacy. 79 This privacy
right is “without government intrusion or intervention without
adequate purpose,”80 and includes a “right to personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.”81 Courts have
articulated what these zones of privacy are and has thus extended
constitutional protections to the following fundamental rights:
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
familial relationships, child rearing, and education.82 In 2003, the
United States Supreme Court took a large leap, in Lawrence v. Texas,
in determining that private consensual sexual conduct is also a
protected liberty interest of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 83

76

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195-97 (1890). Freedom and protection from unreasonable invasions into
one’s personal affairs by the press and other persons.
78
See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
79
Privacy entails freedom to protect your person, information, and place from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government while also providing
protection from governmental intrusion in one’s personal affairs. Taken together, a
conceptualization is created that liberty is intrinsically tied to the right to privacy in
that an individual is free to control his personal realm free from governmental
intrusion and scrutiny.
80
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
81
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
82
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
83
Id.
77
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1) The Legal Framework of a Fundamental Right to Marry
A cursory glance at American case law will show that most
lower courts can hardly dispute that the right to marry is a fundamental
right-- countless courts have explicitly found it.84 The Supreme Court
has referenced such a right fourteen times in its decisions over the
years, and yet the highest court of the nation has failed to explicitly
articulate the right to marry as a fundamental right.85
The landmark case that frames the analysis of privacy and
marriage as a fundamental right is Loving v. Virginia. There the
Supreme Court held that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage
violated Richard and Mildred’s rights under the Due Process Clause.86
The Loving Court stated that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men,” and further recognized that,
“marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man.’”87 Had the
Supreme Court relied on the traditions of the 1960s, the Court would
not have recognized that there was a fundamental right for Mildred
and Richard Loving to be married because the nation’s history was
replete with statutes banning interracial marriages between Caucasians
and African Americans.
Using the same logic, Judge Richard Posner, in Baskin v.
Bogan, dismissed the defendants’ arguments that the traditional
conception of marriage never anticipated same-sex marriage. Judge
Posner pointed out that allowing tradition to define the confines of the
law would have never allowed a decision like Loving to be made. In
effect, following tradition would have continued our history of
invidious discrimination by allowing a statute to promulgate white

84

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
85
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
86
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
87
Id.
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supremacy.88 In the eyes of Judge Posner, tradition cannot be a
legitimate argument for why same-sex marriages should be banned. 89
Since marriage “[is] the most important relation in life,” one can infer
from the Loving Court that as a corollary the right to marry necessarily
entails the right to marry the person of one’s choice.90
Unfortunately, the law did not naturally evolve in this manner,
and it was years before courts would consider the Loving holding, as
Judge Posner did in Baskin v. Bogan, in cases of same-sex marriage.
The explanation rests in part with the reluctance of the Court in
creating new fundamental rights. Once a fundamental right is created,
that right cannot be denied to particular groups on grounds that those
groups have been historically denied that rights.91 Further, the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to narrow the scope of
fundamental rights once articulated, and in this case, the Court has
never framed the right to marry as a more limited right centered on the
characteristics of the couple seeking marriage. For example, the Court
consistently describes a general “right to marry” rather than “‘the right
to interracial marriage,’ ‘the right to inmate marriage’ or the ‘right of
people owing child support to marry.’”92 The Court has also not
specified the fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Although the
Court has referenced the fundamental right to marry many times, it has
never explicitly qualified whom, specifically or generally, is entitled to
the right; the question of whether the fundamental right to marry
applies to same-sex couples is still an unanswered question.
Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, the development of
fundamental rights is typically a slow progression, and the Court will
attempt to frame legal issues as narrowly as possible to halt any
decision-making that seems to be too much like “legislating from the
88

Id. at 11-12.
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 2014).
90
Id.
91
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430 (2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment U.S. CONST. amend.
92
Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1046 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
89
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bench.”93 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986, the Court
framed the legal issue as “whether the Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . . .”94 The
Court, not surprisingly, found that no such fundamental right existed.95
Despite all precedent that might have suggested to the contrary, the
Bowers Court refused to find constitutional privacy protection for two
consenting adults engaging in same-sex sodomy in the home.96 This
case confronts us with the fact that the categories in which legal cases
fall into are as much a product of political philosophy as they are
about principles and the rules.97 The irony of Bowers lies in the fact
that the 1970’s marked a significant period in the jurisprudence of the
law, where the Supreme Court expanded the categories of rights that
intrinsically fall under the fundamental right of privacy.98 Cases such
as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 99 Carey v. Population Services
International,100 Roe v. Wade,101 as a whole, laid out the predicate for
protection of non-procreative sex among unmarried persons.102
Following its own precedent, the Supreme Court in Bowers should
have found that prohibitory sodomy laws violate the constitution
because they infringe on the privacy of adults to make decisions about
their sexual relationships in their own homes without governmental
prosecution. The Bowers court should have framed the question as
93

Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating From the Bench: A Definition and a Defense,
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2007).
94
Bowers v. Hardick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
95
Id.
96
Vincent Samar, Bowers, Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage: A Meeting of
Hard and Very Hard Cases, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 89, 94 (2005) (citing
Bowers v. Hardick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1996)).
97
Id. at 89.
98
Id. at 94.
99
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Established the right of unmarried
persons to possess contraception.
100
Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). A minor has a right to
access contraception.
101
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971). There is a privacy right for abortion.
102
Samar, supra note 93, at 96.
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whether consensual, sexual acts between adults, whether same-gender
or opposite-gender, are protected as a fundamental right rooted in
privacy—not the more narrow question of whether homosexual
sodomy is a fundamental right.
Sixteen years later, in 2003, the Court finally overruled itself in
Lawrence v. Texas.103 There the Court found that its narrow reading of
the legal issue in Bowers “disclosed the Court from appreciating the
extent of the liberty issue at stake.”104 Moreover, the Court found that
the law prohibiting sodomy violated plaintiff’s due process rights to
engage in consensual sexual conduct and intruded into “the personal
and private life of the individual.”105 The Court interpreted the
“privacy” prong of the Due Process Clause to protect individuals from
government intrusion into a dwelling or private place and that sodomy
statutes “touch[] upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”106
In the majority opinion of Lawrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy
took care to distinguish between the ability of the state, consistent with
the Constitution, to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct and the
obligation of the state to recognize same-sex relationships.107
Although Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in her concurring
opinion that the Lawrence case does not imply the legitimacy of samesex relationships, Justice Antonin Scalia argued the opposite.108 Justice
Scalia warned that once the Court prohibited the state from
criminalizing same-gender sexual conduct, the next “logical
conclusion” is that the state should also be prohibited from barring
same-sex marriage.109 This warning from Justice Scalia is what
103

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
Id.
105
Id. at 578.
106
Carlos Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MIN. L. REv. 1184, 1209
(2004).
107
Id. at 1184.
108
Id.
109
Id.
104
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influenced the Court in the earlier Bowers decision. Fearing that the
Court would tread into uncharted waters by more broadly defining the
fundamental right invoked in Bowers, the Court narrowly defined the
legal issue and avoided the discussion entirely. The Court felt that it
was not its job to change the law based on societal views on same-sex
relations at that time.
Regardless of what the Court said it was and was not doing in
Lawrence, the end result was that in striking down Texas’s antisodomy statute, it concluded that lesbians and gay men have liberty
interests rooted in privacy. This liberty interest in privacy extends
from making decisions regarding one’s sexual conduct in one’s
personal relationships to having the state respect their dignity and their
lives in those choices.110 The right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in sexual conduct without
intervention from the government.111
This holding leads to the conclusion that even if the Lawrence
Court is not endorsing same-sex relationships as valid, the mere fact
that the Court outright prohibits the state from criminalizing samegender sexual relations allows for an inference that the ability to refuse
to recognize same-gender relationships, that often accompany samegender sexual relations, becomes harder to do.112
Hence, the first necessary step was taken in order to firmly
change the legal and political discourse across the nation. Lawrence
was the first case to bring sexual orientation to the forefront and
removed a major obstacle from the development of sexual orientationbased equal protection law. As such, many of the lower courts used
this rationale to strike down sodomy laws and over time, allow for
same-sex marriage in their states.
While many courts took advantage of the power within the
Lawrence decision, many grappled with how to apply it because the
Court had failed to clearly define a standard, test, or rule. Although the
Lawrence Court explored the substantive due process prong at length,
110

Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1210-11.
112
Id. at 1185-86.
111
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while evoking theories of liberty and privacy as fundamental rights,
the Court never clearly articulated whether the liberty interest at stake
was fundamental, requiring strict scrutiny, or whether sexual
orientation is a protected status under equal protection grounds.
Using rational basis as the standard of review, the Court was
able to justify that prohibitory sodomy laws were unconstitutional
because they infringed on privacy and liberty, but they did it without
carving new law or naming and identifying a new fundamental right.
To further complicate matters, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
disagreed with the majority’s invocation of the due process clause of
liberty. Justice O’Connor found that the sodomy statute was
unconstitutional not because it violated the right to privacy, but
because it violated equal protection in that it discriminated against
male to male sodomy but permitted male to female sodomy.113 The
Court also did not raise the issue of whether sexual orientation is a
suspect class subject to a higher standard of review than the simple,
deferential rational basis standard.
Even though Lawrence is heralded as the first pro-gay civil
rights case, since that time, there has been no definitive statement on
whether same-sex marriage is encompassed in the meaning of a
fundamental right to marry.114 While not dispositive, advocates will
have additional work to persuade the Supreme Court and the many
state and federal courts to see same-sex marriage bans as violating the
fundamental right to marry.115 The Seventh Circuit, discussed infra116,
chose not even address the issue in Baskin v. Bogan.
B) Marriage and the Equal Protection Clause
In addition to the substantive due process argument—that
marriage is a fundamental right—there are two more legal arguments
113

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor., J. concurring).
Bartschi, supra note 2, at 447.
115
Id. (citing Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) rev'd sub
nom; DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)).
116
Section V, Paragraph B, in this Comment.
114
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challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans based on
the equal protection prong of the Due Process Clause, namely, that
excluding same-sex couples from marriage constitutes impermissible
sex discrimination, and that sexual orientation is, or should be, a
suspect or quasi-suspect class within the meaning of the
Constitution.117
The Equal Protection Clause requires that a law cannot “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”118 To that effect, it was developed to avoid past practices that
may turn out, in retrospect, to be unjust, and must therefore be
corrected for the future. This means that courts use the equal
protection guarantees “to invalidate practices that were widespread at
the time but no longer applicable because they embody certain
background prejudices that have a discriminating effect, even if not
intentional.119 The equal protection guarantee is more suited to protect
novel rights for groups than the substantive due process doctrine
because substantive due process protects values that are rooted in
tradition, while equal protection law can protect against those same
traditions.120
By comparison, the Due Process Clause looks backward and
considers whether an existing convention is violated by a current
practice.121 However, equal protection looks forward, serving to
invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of the law’s
ratification but cannot justifiably be allowed to continue.122 Equal
protection’s nature makes it more congenial to recognizing inequality
where none was thought to exist before.123 “The two clauses there
117

Id. at 478.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
119
Reinheimer, supra note 45, at 227.
120
Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A
Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1161, 1163-74 (1988)).
121
Id. at 227-28.
122
Id. at 228.
123
Id.
118
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operate along different tracks . . . [the Equal Protection Clause] does
not safeguard traditions; it protects against traditions, however longstanding and deeply rooted.”124
For example, consider the bleak history of racism in the United
States: the development of the equal protection guarantee played an
integral role in turning around the deeply rooted practices and laws
that had long served to categorize African Americans as separate from
white Americans. Over time, the equal protection guarantees
confronted racism and helped eradicate notions such as “separate but
equal”125 and helped create substantial protections against race
discrimination. For classifications made based on race, a protected
group, strict scrutiny applies. Any classification based on sex or
gender is considered quasi-suspect126 and subject to some form of
heightened scrutiny.127 Further, the equal protection guarantees not
only protects specific groups or individuals from laws that are plainly
discriminatory on their face, but it also protects from seemingly
neutral laws that have a disparate impact in the way they affect the
protected group.128
1. The Legal Framework of the Equal Protection Clause in Same-Sex
Marriage
Despite the challenges facing arguments grounded in the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state
124

Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
126
Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)) (holding that “[t]o withstand
constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
127
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
128 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970). While aptitude tests and
high school diplomas used as necessary criteria in hiring practices, were not
discriminatory in intent or on its face, in practice they were discriminatory against
minority employees because past practices had prevented minorities from an equal
opportunity to become educated or receive a diploma; therefore the practice had a
disparate effect on that particular subset of the population.
125
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level equal protection arguments have been a central part of every
successful legal case for same-sex marriage.129 In fact, many of the
district courts and the federal circuit courts have been striking down
marriage bans on the basis of equal protection. For example, the
Seventh Circuit in Baskin v. Bogan relied on an equal protection
argument. Further, many states have expanded constitutional
protections to include not only race, sex, national origin, and religion,
but have also added sexual orientation as well as gender identity as a
protected class. Within the Seventh Circuit, both Illinois and
Wisconsin have included sexual orientation as a protected class, while
Indiana has not extended such protections.130 At the federal level,
sexual orientation is not a protected class.
As mentioned above, typically two different arguments have
been made against same-sex marriage bans as violating equal
protection because they discriminate on the basis of sex and sexual
orientation.
A. Sex-Discrimination
The argument is that same-sex marriage bans are
discriminatory because they discriminate against individuals on the
basis of their sex—i.e., a man can only marry a woman because he is a
man, and a woman can only marry a man because she is a woman.
Although sex is presumed to be a protected status under the law, like
race, national origin, religion, etc., any challenge to a statutory
129

Reinheimer, supra note 45, at 227. Cases that have recognized bans on
same-sex marriage to be violations of principles of equal protection include:
Anderson v. King County, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004); Baehr
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. Sup. Ct. 1993); Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d
864 (Vt. 1999); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super.
Ct. 1998); Castle v. State of Washington, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Sep. 7,
2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2004); Li v. State
of Oregon, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004); Woo v. Lockyer, No.
CPF-04-504030, (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, Apr. 13, 2005).
130
American Civil Liberties, Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State
Information, (April 30, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-lawsstate-state-information-map.
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provision classifying on the basis of sex does not receive strict
scrutiny under the law.131 Supreme Court cases like Craig v. Boren132
and United States v. Virginia133 set forth the precedent that sex-based
statutory classifications are deserving of only intermediate scrutiny,
meaning that the challenged law must be “substantially related to an
important governmental purpose.”134 Finding that there could be
legitimate purposes for having sex-based classifications, the Court did
not apply strict scrutiny.135 Yet the Court agreed that statutory
classifications that distinguish between men and women imply that
there is a discernable difference between the sexes’ capabilities, which
have the effect of reinforcing sex-based stereotypes that have been
used to disadvantage women over men.136
Although the sex discrimination argument is so clearly right to
its proponents, it turns out to be either wrong or unworthy of
engagement in the view of the nearly every other judge to whom it has
been presented.137 Sex discrimination tends to be a “risky argument”
for striking marriage bans down, for both judges who reject same-sex
couples’ claims as well as judges who favor marriage equality.138 Out
of all the cases that have used a sex-discrimination argument for why
same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional, only six courts engaged
in any analysis of it and only two accepted it.139
131
132

females.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 78 Stat. 271 (1964).
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Different minimum drinking age for males and

133

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The availability of a
separate military academy for women was an inadequate substitute for the fact that
women were barred from being admitted into an all-male military academy.
134
Id.
135
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
136
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
137
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The
Case of Same-Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
2087, 2113-14 (2014).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 2111-12.
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Courts have rejected the argument following two basic lines of
reasoning. First, many dismiss the argument on the grounds that samesex marriage bans apply equally to both men and women. Second,
many reject the stereotyping theory on the ground that exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage was not intended to perpetuate sex
stereotypes or the subordination of women to men.
The courts have found that sex discrimination is distinguishable from
other types of discrimination.140 For example, the “equal
application”141 anti-miscegenation law in Loving was “designed to
maintain White Supremacy.”142 Courts argue, “sex discrimination is
not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in
Loving.”143 Arguably, the Loving Court stressed equal application of a
law and not the equality of the law. In order to better under the sex
discrimination argument, consider the following example:
“Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C. Dr. A may do so
because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a
woman. Dr. A and Dr. B are people of opposite-sexes who are
similarly situated in the sense that they both want to marry a
person of their choice. The statute disqualifies Dr. B from
marriage solely on the basis of her sex and treats her
differently from Dr. A, a man. That is sex discrimination.”144
But courts argue that even if the same-sex marriage bans are
discriminatory, they are not discriminatory because of sexism, but
rather, because of homophobia.145 Therefore, the sex discrimination
argument does not receive enough traction because the discrimination
140

Id.
According to defendants in Loving, whites were not allowed to marry
blacks, and blacks were not allowed to marry whites, therefore, the law was equally
applied against both races.
142
Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
143
Id. (citing to Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y. 3d 338, 380 (2006)) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting).
144
Id. at 2106 (citing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999)).
145
Id. at 2119.
141
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suffered by gays and lesbians has no connection to their sex but rather
their sexual orientation.
To the contrary, it seems that same-sex bans perpetuate sexstereotyping—a very important subset of sex discrimination. In
restricting marriage to opposite-sex individuals, the state is presuming
or insisting that men and women perform different roles within the
marital relationship and that the different roles are rooted in their
maleness and femaleness.146 This idea objects to the notion that a man
and woman can both fulfill the roles traditionally applied to the
opposite-sex; for example, that women can be breadwinners and that
men can be nurturers and caregivers.
The difficulty of these arguments could be that the law and our
societal norms are not yet adequately developed to support these
claims. From a doctrinal perspective, few cases have addressed sex
stereotyping, and the circuits are split on its application.147 Sex
discrimination claims have typically been made in employment
litigation arising under Title VII violations, typically challenging
grooming, dress codes, and military distinctions, rather than equal
protection grounds.148 Courts overwhelming find that sex-based
distinctions or “sex-based distinctions” could be necessary and
therefore, sparingly used as a legal justification by courts to strike
down discrimination.149 Courts fear that expanding sex discrimination
to encompass arguments against same-sex marriage bans could

146

Id. at 2100.
See Pricewaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293
(D.D.C. 2008). These cases found sex-discrimination in the context of employment
relations.
148
Goldberg, supra note 122, at 2127-28. (citing Jennifer L. Levi, Some
Modest Proposals for Challenging Established Dress Code Jurisprudence, 14 Duke
J. Gender L. & Pol'y 243, 243 (2007) (“[T]he classical gender-based dress code –
requiring women to conform to feminine stereotypes and men to conform to
masculine stereotypes – has, up to the present, been sustained by a majority of the
courts time and again.”)).
149
Id.
147
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muddle the typical sex discrimination arguments. 150 Therefore,
questions regarding its applicability in same-sex marriage claims
remain.151
There are costs associated with sex discrimination being
regarded as an untenable legal argument in favor of striking down
same-sex marriages. For example, a successful sex discrimination
precedent would further help dismantle the usual justifications of
allowing same-sex marriage bans to stand for the “interests of the
child in having a father and a mother” and in the state’s interest in
privileging “natural or unintended procreation.”152 It would also have
the effect of eroding stereotypes about what the roles are played by a
father and a mother in the marital and parental relationship. Lastly, a
recognition of sex-discrimination as a legitimate argument—deserving
of strict scrutiny like race, national origin, religion, etc.—would make
it understood that statutes treating straight and gay people differently
could not pass for anything but invidious discrimination.153
b. Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Notwithstanding the discussion of sex discrimination infra154,
courts across the country have found it easier to frame the legal
question of whether same-sex marriage bans are discriminatory on the
basis of an individuals’ sexual orientation. Although excluding samesex couples from marrying does not physically prevent gays and
lesbians from marriage because they are free to marry members of the
opposite-sex. Yet, courts have concluded that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples prevents gays and lesbians from marrying a

150

Id. at 2126-27.
See id.
152
Id. at 2126-27.
153
Id. at 2139.
154
See discussion infra Section II.B.1.A.
151
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person of the gender to which they are attracted to and effectively
targets and excludes them from marriage as a class.155
Even in cases where courts held in favor of same-sex marriage
bans, nonetheless courts acknowledged “the legislation does confer
advantages on the basis of sexual preference. Those who prefer
relationships with people of the opposite-sex and those who prefer
relationships with people of the same-sex are not treated alike, since
only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits
associated with marriage.”156
In 1996, after the Bowers decision, the Supreme Court first
considered sexual orientation as a status or special class within the
context of the equal protection guarantee as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment, by invalidating a law that discriminated because of the
sexual orientation of gays and lesbians.157 Romer v. Evans concerned
an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited state and
local government entities from taking any action to shield gays,
lesbians, or bisexuals from discrimination.158
The Court held that the amendment was unconstitutional
because it abrogated the government’s power to protect a particular
group from discrimination159 and that the amendment was so broad
that it had no rational relation to Colorado’s stated goals,160 that a
moral objection to the lifestyle of gays and lesbians was an insufficient
155

Bartschi, supra note 2, at 479 (citing I In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
451 (2008)).
156
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 362 (2006); see also Andersen v. King
County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 19 (2006). Court upheld marriage ban but found that the
law discriminated against lesbians and gay men.
157
Franklin, supra note 53, at 857.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 858.
160
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996). In Romer, the state argued that
this amendment was necessary to “protect the physical and psychological well-being
of . . . children”, by promoting “heterosexual marriage as the foundation of a stable
family unit” and “ ‘to avert unnecessary suffering of . . . [young people] who may be
influenced relative to their sexual preference’ if the government failed to sufficiently
convey its disapprobation of homosexuality”.
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reason to justify the law.161 The Court added, “if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”162 Although the Court said it was using a rational basis
review standard, Romer’s legal analysis perfectly fits in the heightened
scrutiny rubric. For example, the Court found animus towards a
historically targeted group because the state passed an amendment that
specifically discriminated against gays and lesbians. Further, the Court
found that the amendment was overly broad, and had the effect of
erasing the group’s political power.163 Many call the Court’s “new”
constitutional standard “rational basis with a bite.”164
There are many parallel conclusions to be drawn between the
similarities of Romer, decided in 1996, and Lawrence, decided in
2006.165 In both decisions the Court was clear in using explicit
language that set forth a standard that in application it failed to use.166
It appears that the Court showed restraint in not explicitly setting forth
sweeping precedent, but the legal rhetoric used in its analysis shows
that the Court was articulating a stricter standard than rational basis.
Legal scholars argue that the meaning of Lawrence and Romer
is read between the lines, and the power of Romer is in what was left
unsaid. Romer struck down an amendment that discriminated on the
basis of sexual orientation, and even though the Court argued that it
was using rational basis review, it did not classify sexual orientation as
a protected status under the law.167 Yet, the Court’s legal reasoning
squarely analyzed the Colorado amendment within the framework of

161

Id. at 621.
Id. at 635.
163
Id. at 632.
164
Gayle Lynn Perringa, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name. 62 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 779,780 (1987).
165
Samar, supra note 93, at 100-03.
166
Bartschi, supra note 2, at 487.
167
Id.
162
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heightened scrutiny.168 Perhaps, one reasons for why the Romer Court
may have been hesitant to carve sexual orientation as a protected
status deserving of heightened scrutiny explicitly, in part, was to
prevent invalidating vast amounts of legislation that was being created
at the time, namely, DOMA and the “mini DOMAs” of the states.
Given the “limited” holding of Romer within the political
climate at the time, Romer was one of the first cases that initiated the
conversation with the public and helped frame the legal issue with
respect to certain ways of regulating gays and lesbians that might
violate constitutional equality norms. The decision played an integral
role in developing how the courts understand the legal issues
surrounding gays and lesbians, especially by addressing what
egregious discrimination against gays and lesbians looks like.169 In
hindsight, it is easier to discern that Romer created the outlines of a
new constitutional principle that would later come to play a central
role in cases involving sexual orientation discrimination,170 but for
many years its precedential value lay dormant until United States v.
Windsor. By the time the Court decided Windsor, the Court was able
to use Romer in order to respond to, rather than dictate a view that
sexual orientation discrimination violates constitutional equality
principles.171
As mentioned above, since the time of Romer, courts have
begun seeing sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
“Laws signaling out [gay persons] for disparate treatment are subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure those laws are not the product
of such historical prejudice and stereotyping.”172 California’s Supreme
Court held that “there is no persuasive basis for applying to statutes
that classify persons on the basis of the suspect classification of sexual
orientation a standard less rigorous that applied to statutes that classify

168

Id.
Franklin, supra note 53, at 858.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 870.
172
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 175 (2008).
169
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on the basis of suspect classifications of gender, race, or religion.”173
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that “intermediate scrutiny
must be applied in this case because the LGBT community is a
discrete group that has been subjected to a history of purposeful
discrimination, and it has not had sufficient political strength to protect
itself from such discrimination.”174
Yet there is no clear consensus on whether sexual orientation is
a protected status under the Fourteenth Amendment. Many courts have
refused to address whether sexual orientation is a suspect or quasisuspect class. For example, the Vermont and Massachusetts judiciary
avoided the question by invalidating marriage bans on rational basis
review and circumvented the discussion on sexual orientation.175 On
the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals held that sexual
preference could get heightened scrutiny, but not in the cases of
marriage and family relationships.176 The Washington Supreme Court
and the high court in Maryland found that sexual orientation is not
subject to heightened scrutiny because there is no conclusive evidence
that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic.177 Further, in
Hernandez v. Robles, the Court of Appeals of New York found that
gays and lesbians do not constitute a politically powerless group,
because they have adequate representation within the legislature and
therefore do not require additional protection through the judiciary.178
In spite of the judiciary, through legislative action, states like
Maryland and Massachusetts now classify sexual orientation as a
protected class.179 To date, eighteen states and the District of
Columbia have added sexual orientation and gender identity as a

173

In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 844 (2008).
Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013).
175
Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194 (1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440
Mass. 309 (2003).
176
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y. 3d 338, 388 (2006).
177
Goldberg, supra note 122, at 2116-18.
178
Hernandez, 7 N.Y. 3d at 388.
179
American Civil Liberties Website map, supra note 115.
174
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protected class to their state constitutions.180 Additionally, New York,
New Hampshire, and Wisconsin only classify sexual orientation as a
protect class but not gender identity.181 Illinois amended the Human
Rights Act in 2005 in order to add sexual orientation as a protected
suspect class.182 However, Indiana has no such protections.183
On June 26, 2013, in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme
Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA—which had defined
“marriage” and “spouse” to include only unions of persons of the
opposite-sex—because it violated the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fifth Amendment.184 In Windsor, two women were
legally married in Canada and were residing in New York where the
marriage was recognized. 185 Unfortunately, when one of the spouses
died, the IRS denied a marital deduction for property the other
inherited from her late wife on the grounds of DOMA—i.e., that she
was not a “spouse” under Section 3 of the act.186 Overturning DOMA
had the immediate consequences of restructuring how the federal law
recognizes and treats same-sex marriage for the purposes of federal
rights, including Social Security, federal tax benefits, gift giving,
estate planning and inheritance, employee benefits, IRA accounts, etc.
The Windsor decision heralded consistency between the federal and
state government and struck down the biggest legal rationale in
support for same-sex marriage bans.
However, just as in Lawrence and Romer, the Windsor Court
inexplicably left out an analysis of what level of scrutiny it used to
determine that DOMA is unconstitutional, leaving out any discussion

180

Id.
Id.
182
755 ILCS 5/1-101.1.
183
American Civil Liberties Website map, supra note 115.
184
DOMA, supra note 18.
185
See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2719 (2013).
186
Id.
181
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of its professed justifications.187 The Windsor Court “addressed
federalism, paraded liberty, hinted at equal protection, and nodded at
due process, but never articulated a defined legal construct within
which to proceed.”188 As a result, “litigants on both sides of the [samesex marriage] issue [thought they could] rely on Windsor to support
[their] position.”189 Even Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion
argued that Windsor’s real rationale was a “disappearing trail of . . .
legalistic argle bargle.”190 But the majority comprehensively
discussed almost every legal argument and topic ever discussed in the
context of same-sex marriage law.191
Although Windsor did not resolve the issue of what level of
scrutiny must be afforded to challenges alleging sexual orientation
discrimination, the issue was raised by an unexpected source. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued an unprecedented 28 U.S.C. §
530D192 letter expressing both its decision not to defend DOMA’s
constitutionality and the Department’s position that legislative
classifications based on sexual orientation should be accorded
heightened scrutiny.193 The Department of Justice cited to Lawrence,
Romer, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center194 as support
for its decision. The letter stated that heightened scrutiny should apply
to sexual orientation because it satisfies the four heightened scrutiny
factors: (1) there is “a significant history of purposeful discrimination
against gays and lesbians . . . based on prejudice and stereotypes that
187

Monica Hof Wallace and Christopher Gerald Otten, Marriage Equality:
The “States” of the Law Post Windsor and Perry, 16 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 239, 244
(2014).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
191
Id.
192
28 U.S.C. §530D (2002).
193
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
CONGRESS ON LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involvingdefense-marriage-act.
194
Id.
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have ramifications today,” (2) sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic, (3) LGBT individuals have “limited political power,”
and (4) sexual orientation has no bearing on ability to perform or
contribute to society.195 The letter went on to state that “[t]he President
has concluded that given [these] factors . . . sexual orientation should
be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.”196 Effectively, the
letter from the Department of Justice indicated that DOMA did not
even have support from the governmental body tasked with the
responsibility of defending the law. The gesture struck DOMA as void
and null.
Together, the statement from the DOJ and Windsor created a
whirlwind of legislation spanning the country aimed at dismantling
same-sex marriage bans. Pundits trying to analyze the consequences of
Windsor have stated that the case is a “equal liberty” case in that it has
fused together the two separate tracks of same-sex marriage
jurisprudence, that of due process and equal protection.197 They argue
that the decision has created a bridge from the past cases that
embraced equal protection and liberty principles and has laid a
precedential path for future cases.198 These attestations of the meaning
and effect of Windsor have all been made without the Court
expressing a clear and explicit standard of review. A debate centers on
whether the Court used rational basis review, or perhaps the “more
searching form of rational review,” known colloquially as “rational
basis with a bite.”199 Regardless, lower courts have broadly applied
Windsor in striking same-sex marriage bans nationwide.200A broad
understanding of Windsor stands for the premise that gays and
lesbians deserve the same legal rights and protections as everyone
195

Id.
Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle
Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J. L. &
SEXUALITY 17, 29 (2014).
197
Marcus, supra note 193, at 19.
198
Id. at 32-33.
199
Id. (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481
(9th Cir. 2014)).
200
Marcus, supra note 193, at 22.
196
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else. At the very least, the Windsor case means that judges do not have
to start from scratch in determining if a right exists, or if gays and
lesbians should be constitutionally protected.
V. THE LITIGATION
A. Wolf v. Walker, U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin
On February 3, 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the law firm of Mayer Brown filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on behalf of four
same-sex couples, challenging Article XIII, § 12 of the Wisconsin
Constitution which states, in relevant part, that: “[o]nly a marriage
between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state. A legal status identical or substantially similar to
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized in this state.”201 In addition, various provisions in the
Wisconsin Statutes, primarily in chapter 765, limit marriage to a
“husband” and a “wife.”202
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment while
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.203 Judge Barbara Crabb denied
defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s motion, holding that: (1)
there is a fundamental right to marry under Due Process Clause
encompassing the right to marry someone of the same-sex, (2)
Wisconsin’s marriage amendment and relevant statutes were subject to
heightened scrutiny, (3) heightened scrutiny applies to equal
protection claims involving sexual orientation, and (4) that
Wisconsin’s marriage amendment did not further any legitimate state
interest.204
201

Wolf v. Walker, 986 F.Supp. 2d 982, 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
202
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During oral arguments, defendants argued that: (1) Baker v.
Nelson was controlling law206; (2) that the right to marriage was a
“positive right” that the state had no duty to grant the right to
everyone; and (3) the state had a legitimate interest in “preserving
tradition, encouraging procreation and ‘responsible’ procreation,
providing an environment for ‘optimal child rearing’, protecting the
institution of marriage, proceeding with caution and helping to
maintain other legal restrictions on marriage.”207
Judge Crabb concluded that Baker was not valid law given the
developments in the jurisprudence of the law in same-sex marriage
cases. When Baker was first decided in 1972, the law had just
recognized a protected right in marriage under the Loving framework,
and it had not contemplated sexual orientation as a suspect class. In
fact, at the time, Bowers had not even been decided and sodomy laws
were still widely applicable and valid across the United States.
Further, Judge Crabb cited Romer and Lawrence that have since
reframed the legal issues first introduced in Baker, Judge Crabb
commented that if defendants were still not convinced that Baker was
dead, then the most recent Supreme Court case, Windsor made it clear
that Baker’s precedential value has deteriorated.208
205

205

See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310 (1971). The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that same-sex couples do not have a right to marry under the due process clause
or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. When the plaintiffs
appealed, the United States Supreme Court had “no discretion to refuse adjudication
of the case on its merits” because the version of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 in effect at the
time required the Court to accept any case from a state supreme court that raised a
constitutional challenge to a state statute. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Minnesota for want of a substantial
federal question. The Supreme Court of MN has held that: (1) the absence of an
express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages did not mean same-sex
marriages are authorized; and (2) state authorization of same-sex marriages is not
required by the Unites States Constitution.
206
Wolf, 986 F.Supp. 2d at 982.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 987-88 (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 178-79 (2d
Cir. 2012)). “Even if Baker might have had resonance for Windsor's case in 1971, it
does not today.”
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Then, the court turned to defendants’ second argument that
marriage was a right granted by the State of Wisconsin and as a
“positive right” it need not include all individuals. Judge Crabb
quickly dismissed that as a tenable argument, citing that case law is
replete with evidence and precedent that marriage is not a “positive
right” but a fundamental right protected by the constitution.209 As
such, any state action infringing upon that right must be subject to
strict scrutiny.210At debate was not the whether marriage was a
positive right, but whether restricting marriage to same-sex couples
was discriminatory on its face. Once the state extends that benefit to
some of its citizens, it is not free to deny the benefit to other citizens
for any or no reason on the ground that a “positive right” is at issue.211
Therefore, “[t]he State may not . . . selectively deny its protective
services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal
Protection Clause.”212
Next, defendants argued that they did not want to “endorse”
same-sex marriage and for that reason have acted to restrict it.213
Pointing to Romer and Bowers, Judge Crabb found that the
defendants’ argument had been used before, and these arguments had
failed then, and would fail here, too. Allowing citizens the right to
same-sex marriage is not an endorsement by the state; rather it

209

Id. at 991; E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967). The “liberty” protected by the due process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the “fundamental right” to marry, a conclusion that the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed many times. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1977) (“[The] right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 639-640 (“This Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
210
Wolf, 986 F.Supp. 2d at 991.
211
Id. at 992.
212
Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Serv., 489 U.S. 109
(1989)).
213
Id.
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represents “a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of
persons are at stake.”214
Lastly, the defendants also relied on Windsor to set forth their
argument that marriage falls exclusively under the purview of the
state. The state is free to regulate marriage according to its state
interests. However, Judge Crabb found defendants’ and amici’s
reliance on Windsor misplaced for three reasons.215 First, although
Windsor devoted seven pages to develop an analysis of state rights vis
a vis constitutional rights, Windsor explicitly stated that “no one
questions the power of the States to define marriage”216 Yet, the Court
was not articulating a new, heightened level of deference to marriage
regulation by the states.217 Second, Windsor strictly relied on
federalism grounds for concluding that DOMA was
unconstitutional.218 Third, and most important, the Court discussed
DOMA's encroachment on state authority as evidence that the law was
unconstitutional, not as a reason to preserve a law that otherwise
would be invalid.219 In fact, the Court was careful to point out multiple
times the well-established principle that an interest in federalism

214

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); see also Bowers v. Hardick,
478 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A] necessary corollary of
giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the
fact that different individuals will make different choices.”).
215
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 994-995.
216
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But
no one questions the power of the States to define marriage (with the concomitant
conferral of dignity and status), so what is the point of devoting seven pages to
describing how long and well established that power is?”).
217
Wolf, 986 F.Supp. 2d at 995.
218
Windsor,133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is unnecessary to
decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution
because it disrupts the federal balance.”); see also id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he opinion has formally disclaimed reliance upon principles of
federalism.”); but see id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is undeniable that
its judgment is based on federalism.”).
219
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
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cannot trump constitutional rights.220 Windsor’s less than clear cut
analysis allows for both proponents and opponents to same-sex
marriage find arguments supportive of their position.221 But, in Judge
Crabb’s opinion, she refutes any argument to the contrary about
Windsor’s relevance as a case expanding protections and rights for the
LGBT.222
Turning to the equal protection claims, Judge Crabb
immediately dismissed the sex discrimination claim, finding that it is
not analogous to the reasoning in Loving, as articulated infra,223 and
that courts found this argument as “counterintuitive and legalistic, and
an attempt to ‘bootstrap’ sexual orientation discrimination to sex
discrimination.”224 Since the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
also failed to embrace the theory of sex discrimination, Judge Crabb
sought to decide the case on other grounds and chose to overlook the
entire argument.225
While analyzing Romer and Windsor, Judge Crabb found that
although Court in those cases was claiming to use rational basis
review, she argued that they were using “something more”.226 Judge
Crabb takes this to indicate that perhaps the Supreme Court is on the
verge of finding sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class.227 The district court here also determined that the Seventh
220

Windsor,133 S. Ct. at 2691 (majority opinion) (“State laws defining and
regulating marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights of
persons.”); id. at 2692 (“[T]he incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are
uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to
constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.”); id at 2691 (“The States'
interest in defining and regulating the marital relation [is] subject to constitutional
guarantees.”); id.
221
See generally, Marcus, supra note 193.
222
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
223
For a developed discussion, please see my section, located supra, entitled
“The Legal Framework of the Equal Protection Clause in Same-Sex Marriage.”
224
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
225
Id. at 1009.
226
Id. at 1010.
227
Id.
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Circuit had not engaged in any analysis of whether heightened scrutiny
applies to sexual orientation challenges,228 therefore, leaving her free
to consider the factors relevant to determining if heightened scrutiny
should apply.229 She concluded that gays and lesbians: (1) have faced a
history of discrimination; (2) sexual orientation has no bearing on their
ability to contribute to society; (3) sexual orientation is immutable, it
is fundamental to a person’s identity; and (4) are politically powerless
in the sense of an “inherent vulnerab[ility] in the context of the
ordinary political process, either because of . . . size or history of
disenfranchisement.230 Given that the District Court found that sexual
orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny, Judge Crabb found that
Wisconsin must show that their prohibition on same-sex marriage is
substantially related to an important governmental objective to survive
heightened scrutiny.231
Here, Judge Crabb was not impressed with the arguments made
by Wisconsin. Starting with tradition, Judge Crabb argues that not all
traditions are good traditions and following them blindly can have bad
results. 232 Traditions such as coverture, the fusing of a woman’s legal
identity into her husband’s after marriage, had the effect of dismissing
her political being out of existence.233 Women did not always have the
right to vote and at a time were not considered equals to men.234
228

Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying rational
basis review to a law banning gays in the military); but see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92
F.3d 446, 457-58 (1996) (stating that Ben-Shalom's holding was limited to the
military context).
229
Id. at 1011.
230
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
231
Id. at 1014.
232
Id. at 1019.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 1018. Similarly, women were deprived of many opportunities,
including the right to vote, for much of this country's history, often because of
“traditional” beliefs about women's abilities. E.g., Bradwell v. People of State of
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. . . . The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
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Following tradition can also mean “the [r]ote reliance on [an]
historical exclusion as justification . . . serv[ing] to justify slavery,
anti-miscegenation laws and segregation.”235
Wisconsin argued that their restriction on same-sex marriage
bans are needed to channel opposite-sex couples into marriage in order
to ensure that they will stay together after procreation and that samesex couples do not need this protection because they are not at risk of
accidentally procreating.236 As other courts have noted, an argument
relying on procreation raises an obvious question: if the reason samesex couples cannot marry is that they cannot procreate, then why are
opposite-sex couples who cannot or will not procreate allowed to
marry?237 Judge Crabb found Wisconsin’s arguments inconsistent.238
On one-hand defendants argued that same-sex couples do not need
marriage because they can raise children responsibly without it. On the
other hand, defendants argued that same-sex couples should not be
raising children at all.239 Defendants argued that opposite-sex marriage
promotes “optimal child rearing” but provided no justification for how
or why same-sex couples could not raise children well, nor did
defendants show that Wisconsin asked each marriage applicant to
make any showing that they are good parents or have financial means
to support child rearing.240 In fact, felons, alcoholics, or a person with
a history of child abuse may obtain a marriage license in Wisconsin.241
Again, the state’s argument that banning same-sex marriage is a
mother. This is the law of the Creator.”). With respect to marriage in particular, there
was a time when “the very being or legal existence of [a] woman [was] suspended”
when she married. William Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, 442-45 (1765).
235
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y. 3d 338, 388 (2006).
236
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
237
E.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Wis. Stat. §
765.03(1) (permitting first cousins to marry if “the female has attained the age of 55
years or where either party, at the time of application for a marriage license, submits
an affidavit signed by a physician stating either party is permanently sterile”).
238
Id. at 1021.
239
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 1023.

289
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/3

42

Drake: The Twenty-Five-Year Struggle for Marriage Equality: What Impact

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

method of promoting good parenting calls into question the sincerity
of this asserted state interest.242 Judge Crabb also found that the
“optimal child rearing” argument is an insincere one considering that
the state of Wisconsin has allowed same-sex couples to adopt and
raise children together for many years. 243What the same-sex marriage
ban does is foster less than optimal results of the children of same-sex
couples who are stigmatized and deprived of the benefits of
marriage.244
Lastly, Judge Crabb pointed out that if the state will deprive an
entire group of people the fundamental right to marry, then, the state
needs to offer a stronger justification than “this is the way it has
always been” or “we’re not ready yet.”245 At the very least the state
had to make a showing that the restriction on same-sex marriage
furthers a legitimate state interest separate from a wish to maintain the
status quo. 246
Relying on Loving, Romer, Lawrence and Windsor, the district
court held that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional and
therefore, struck them down. Immediately, county clerks started
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Wisconsin state
officials attempted to thwart the issuance of licenses by asking Judge
Crabb to grant an injunction, despite that the defendants had failed to
include that request in their initial pleadings. Judge Crabb did not
consider their plea. An appeal was subsequently filed by the
Wisconsin defendants to the Seventh Circuit Court.

242

Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 988.
246
Id. at 987-88.
243
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B. Baskin v. Bogan, U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana.
On March 12, 2014, Lambda Legal filed Baskin v. Bogan247 in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on
behalf of five same-sex couples.248 The complaint charged that Section
31-11-1-1 and Section 31-11-1-1(b)249 of the Indiana Code, which
banned same-sex marriage and the recognition of these marriages,
violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.250 Plaintiffs
sought declarative and injunctive relief. 251
First the Court addressed a number of preliminary matters,
related to who had proper standing as a defendant in the case.252 Then,
in an almost parallel fashion to the holding of Wolf v. Walker, the
Court in Baskin held that the Indiana statute banning same-sex
marriage violated same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry; that
247

Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
Initially there were three same-sex couples to the complaint, but the
complaint was later amended to add two more couples; one of which was a married
couple from Massachusetts, living in Indiana. One spouse was terminally ill and the
couple sought an emergency order for a preliminary injunction from the court, in
order for their valid marriage to be recognized in Indiana.
249
Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1 states:
(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if
the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.
250
Baskin,12 F. Supp. 3d. at 1150.
251
Id.
252
On April 10, 2014 the court granted a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Indiana from enforcing section b of Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1. Both parties
moved for summary judgment, as there were no issues of material fact. On May 2,
2014, when motions for summary judgment were being heard, the court granted a
preliminary injunction extending the temporary restraining order.
A second issue the Court had to address was which defendants had proper
standing. The Court found that the IN Dept. of Rev. and Attorney General Zoeller
had standing because they were tasked with enforcing the law and regulating its
consequences, while Governor Mike Pence was found to lack standing and was
dismissed as a party.
248
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the statute did not discriminate against same-sex couples on the basis
of their sex, but it did discriminate on the basis of their sexual
orientation and finally, that there was no rational basis for treating
same-sex couples differently by excluding them from marriage.253
Just like Wisconsin in Wolf, Indiana in Baskin argued that
Indiana’s statute was constitutional and based on the legal precedent
and applicability of Baker v. Nelson254 arguing that “lower courts are
bound . . . until such time as the [Supreme] Court tells them that they
are not.”255 Chief Judge Robert L. Young countered by stating that
“‘when doctrinal developments indicate,’ lower courts need not adhere
to the summary disposition.”256 “In the forty years after Baker, there
have been manifold changes to the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence” and that “[e]ven if Baker might have had resonance . . .
in 1971, it does not today.”257
After determining that Baker had no precedential value, the
court considered whether there was a fundamental right to marry, what
level of scrutiny to apply, and whether the bans discriminate against
gays and lesbians because of their sex and sexual orientation. Relying
on Loving, Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, Judge Young found ample
evidence in the case law to support that there is an undisputed
fundamental right to marry,258 and the Judge reiterated that once a
“fundamental right [is] recognized, [it] cannot be denied to particular
groups on grounds that these groups have historically been denied
those rights.259 Judge Young used Loving to best illustrate this
concept.260 Had the court considered that a fundamental right only
253

Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
Id. at 1153.
255
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).
256
Id.
257
Windsor, 699 F.2d at 178.
258
For a detailed discussion, see supra note 177; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“Our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education.”).
259
Samar, supra note 86 at 94.
260
Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1158 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
254
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encompasses what it had traditionally, then Mildred and Richard
Loving would have never been able to get married, since bans
interracial marriage were longstanding since colonial times.261 Judge
Young argued that the same logic applied to same-sex marriage;
defendants cannot argue that because same-sex couples traditionally
have not been allowed to marry and therefore, they do not have a
fundamental right to do so.262
Finally, the court found that Indiana’s statute significantly
interferes with the fundamental right to marry because it completely
banned the plaintiffs from marrying the person of their choosing.263
Indiana argued that the same-sex marriage bans served the legitimate
state’s interest in ensuring that one man and one woman stay together
for the sake of unintended children that their sexual relation may
bring.264 But, the court failed to find how the Indiana’s proffered
justification is narrowly tailored to the state’s interest, i.e., how can a
concern affecting opposite-sex couples relate to whether same-sex
couples should be permitted to marry? Indiana’s restriction is both
under-inclusive as well as over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because
it only prevents one subset of couples, those who cannot naturally
conceive children, from marrying, while post-menopausal woman,
infertile couples, or couples who do not want children are not
prevented from marrying.265 The statute is over-inclusive because the
statute prohibits some opposite-sex couples who can naturally and
unintentionally procreate from marrying, like close relatives or cousins
from marrying.266 Ultimately, excluding same-sex couples from
marriage has no effect on opposite-sex couples and on the choices they
make relating to procreation or staying together.267 Given these
factors, the court said that Indiana’s restriction on same-sex marriage
261

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430 (2008).
Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1155-57.
263
Id. at 1158.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
262
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was not narrowly tailored and the defendants have failed to prove their
burden.268 Judge Young used strict scrutiny to frame his analysis.269
Then, the court addressed the equal protection arguments,
asking whether Section 31-11-1-1 and 21-11-1-1(b) of the Indiana
Code violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates
against gays and lesbians because of their sex as well as sexual
orientation. Yet again, like many other courts before it, including the
Wolf Court, the Baskin court found that there is no evidence of
invidious sex-based discrimination. The court argued that Loving is
not an analogous metaphor and the law’s purpose is not to reinforce a
sex stereotype about the abilities of men and woman or to impose
traditional gender roles on individuals.270
On the other hand, the court found that there is discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation even while using rational basis
review.271 While Indiana argued that gays and lesbians are not
prevented from marrying an individual of the opposite-sex, the Court
found that the law was specifically created to prevent gays and
lesbians from marrying the individual of their choice.272 Following the
Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Baskin Court also chose to use rational
basis review.273
To Judge Young, it is clear that the issue is whether excluding
same-sex couples has a rational connection to the purported interest of
dealing with unintentional and natural conception by opposite-sex
268

Id.
Id.
270
Id. at 1159.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
The Wolf Court disagreed. The Wolf Court analyzed the Seventh Circuit’s
Schroeder v. Hamilton differently. The Wolf Court found that the Seventh Circuit
only referenced in dicta the required constitutional scrutiny that should be used for
sexual orientation discrimination cases. Therefore, the Wolf Court found that since
the question was not definitively answered by the Seventh Circuit, they opted to use
a heightened level of scrutiny. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946
(7th Cir. 2002) (Homosexuals are not entitled to any heightened protection under the
Constitution).
269
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couples in enforcing the ban. 274He found that the only rationale for
the ban is to exclude same-sex couples on the basis of their sexual
orientation.275
Therefore, the District Court of Indiana struck down the
marriage bans because they are unconstitutional. Judge Young granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary
injunction.
C. Baskin v. Bogan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit
Displeased with the rulings of the District Courts, state
officials in Indiana and Wisconsin brought forth separate appeals to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On motion
from the plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit consolidated Baskin v.
Bogan276 with Wolf v. Walker. The court also expedited the legal
proceedings by ordering completion of briefings by August 5, 2014.
The Seventh Circuit scheduled oral arguments before a three- judge
panel, including Judges Richard Posner, David Hamilton, and Ann
Claire Williams for August 26, 2014.
On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit in a unanimous
opinion, authored by Judge Posner, upheld the district courts’
decisions.277 Immediately, on September 15, the Seventh Circuit
granted a motion for a stay of the ruling to be in effect until this case
or one like it was resolved at the Supreme Court.278 But, on October 6,
2014, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, letting the Circuit
court decision stand.279

274

Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1159.
Id.
276
Lambda Legal website. Baskin v. Bogan, (June 25, 2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/baskin-v-bogan.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
275
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The Seventh Circuit was the third circuit court to issue an
opinion on same-sex marriage and it was the first unanimous circuit
court opinion overturning a state marriage ban.280 The opinion was
authored by Judge Posner, who based on his questions during oral
argument and his written opinion, established himself as one of the
most indignant judges to approach the issue281. Judge Posner’s
position on same-sex marriage has shifted over the last two decades;
he used to oppose increased protections and rights for the LGBT
community.282 Since then, it is clear his opinion has greatly shifted.
Judge Posner opened his opinion and announced that,
“[f]ormally these cases are about discrimination against the small
homosexual minority in the United States. But at a deeper level . . .
they are about the welfare of American children . . . [c]hildren [that]
would be better off both emotionally and economically if their
adoptive parents were married.”283 He framed the legal issue as
beyond an evaluation of the bans from rational basis.284 Instead, he
immediately implicated heightened scrutiny that assesses the harm
caused by the restriction as one of its four prongs.285
Judge Posner reiterated that although marriage falls under the
purview of state regulation and courts must be weary of legislating
from the bench, same-sex marriage bans statutorily create a
classification that “proceed[s] along suspect lines,” and therefore, it
falls to the Seventh Circuit to assess the statutory bans legitimacy
under the framework of the Fourteenth Amendment. 286 Without any
undue delay, Judge Posner then outlined that even under rational basis
review, Indiana and Wisconsin, have failed to provide the requisite
280

Id.
Wallace, supra note 161, at 343.
282
See Richard A. Posner, Should There be Homosexual Marriage? And If So,
Who Should Decide? The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to
Civilized Commitment. By William N. Eskridge, Jr. New York: The Free Press. 95
MICH. L. REV. 1578, (1997).
283
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
281
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justifications that the ban serves “reasonably conceivable state of
facts” or that a “‘reasonable basis’ for forbidding same-sex marriage’
exists.” 287 For the court, “the only rationale that [Indiana and
Wisconsin] have put [forward] with any conviction [is] that same-sex
couples and their children do [not] need marriage because same-sex
couples can [not] produce children, intended or unintended.” Judge
Posner finds that this legal argument “is so full of holes that it cannot
be taken seriously.”288 Because the discrimination is “irrational and
because the [statutory bans] failed under an equal protection analysis,
the court [does not] discuss the plaintiffs' due process claims, or
determine whether the right to choose whom to marry is a fundamental
right.”289
Judge Posner added that although the case is easily won in
favor of the plaintiffs using rational basis review, he nevertheless
outlined in detail a heightened scrutiny analysis because sexual
orientation typically falls “along suspect lines”. Judge Posner first
asked whether the challenged practice involves discrimination, rooted
in a history of prejudice, against some identifiable group of persons,
resulting in unequal treatment harmful to them.290 He answered that
without a doubt “homosexuals are among the most stigmatized,
misunderstood, and discriminated against minorities in the history of
the world.”291 Secondly, he asked if there is unequal treatment based
on “some immutable . . . characteristic of the people discriminated
against,” and is the characteristic irrelevant to that person's ability to
participate in society?292 Judge Posner found that “there is little doubt
that sexual orientation . . . is an immutable . . . characteristic rather
than a choice.”293 The court proceeded to cite to the American
Psychological Association as well as various scientific journals that set
287

Id.
Id. at 656.
289
Id. at 657.
290
Id. at 655.
291
Id. at 658.
292
Wallace, supra note 161, at 345.
293
Id.
288
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forth leading scientific theories that the causes of homosexuality are
genetic.294 The court then spent the rest of the forty-paged decision
analyzing the following two questions: “does the discrimination, even
if based on an immutable characteristic, nevertheless confer an
important offsetting benefit on society as a whole? . . . . [and,] [even if
the policy] confer[s] an offsetting benefit, is [i]t discriminatory . . .
[because the government could achieve its goal in a less-harmful
manner to the discriminated-against group?]”295
Judge Posner, under a regime focused on rational basis,
questioned whether the sum of the benefits provided by allowing only
opposite-sex marriage equate to an offsetting governmental interest to
justify the denial to same-sex couples.296 Before he dived into the
question, he quickly dispelled the notion that Baker v. Nelson has
applicable precedential value using the same logic and arguments as
District Court Judges Crabb and Young.297
Indiana defended the same-sex marriage ban on a single
ground, namely, that their sole purpose in sanctioning marriage is to
enhance child welfare.298 Indiana tried to “channel unintentionally
procreative sex into a legal regime in which the biological father is
required to assume parental responsibility”.299 Even if gays and
lesbians want to enter into the regime, Indiana argued that various
individuals, like friends and siblings could want to as well, but the
state still has the right to refuse sanctioning those relations.300 Indiana
argued that offering state benefits to opposite-sex couples is the
“carrot” to induce them to enter into the marital regime.301 Indiana
further argued that gays and lesbians do not need to be induced into
the marital regime because they do not naturally or unintentionally
294

Baskin, 766 F.3d at 657.
Id. at 655.
296
Id. at 659.
297
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id. at 660.
300
Id.
301
Id.
295
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procreate and therefore, do not need to be allowed to enter the
institution of marriage.302 Judge Posner found these legal arguments
untenable, and that the mechanisms used to induce unwilling fathers to
own up to their parental responsibility already exists within the court
system, like paternity testing, and child support.303 Further, Judge
Posner found that since Indiana allows infertile couples to marry, their
reason that the law channels procreative sex, would logically conclude
that there is no reason to allow infertile couples to marry.304 Judge
Posner found that Indiana’s justifications for the ban have resulted in
an insidious form of discrimination, one that favors first cousins over
homosexuals. As a matter of comity, Indiana recognizes the marriage
of first cousins from other states, like Tennessee, where no restriction
is enforced.305 Elderly first cousins are permitted to marry because
they cannot produce children; homosexuals are forbidden to marry
because they cannot produce children. Indiana’s argument is that the
marriage of first cousins who are past child-bearing age provides a
“model [of] family life for younger, potentially procreative men and
women.” Judge Posner finds this argument “impossible to take
seriously.”306
The bottom line of Judge Posner’s argument is that the
classification is over-inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time.307
Indiana’s law is punishing responsible same-sex couples who wish to
enter into the institution of marriage, who possibly have adopted or
plan to adopt children, while rewarding irresponsible opposite-sex
couples who procreate without forethought by allowing them into the
institution of marriage. Judge Posner is less convinced by Indiana’s
arguments when he asks the defendants’ attorney, about same-sex

302

Id.
Id.
304
Id. at 661.
305
Id. at 667.
306
Id. at 662.
307
See Wolf v. Walker analysis on same issue supra n. 191.
303
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adoption, which is a legal and widely accepted practice in Indiana.308
Judge Posner found that adopting unwanted children is a positive
societal goal that should not be qualified by whether the parents are
same-sex or opposite-sex.309 It is undisputed that it is better for
children to be raised in a stable household, where they can enjoy the
recognition, stability, state and federal benefits of such a legally
recognized union regardless of the sex and sexual orientation of the
parents310. Judge Posner illustrated a hypothetical situation where a
child comes some from school and asks why his same-sex parents are
not married and the answer is that the law does not allow them to do
so. 311 Judge Posner argues that this realization is unsettling to the
young child, because it takes away from his security, making the child
feel different than his peers.312 Lastly, Judge Posner argued that
Indiana’s law has not been very successful at encouraging people to
get married because the rate of single mothers has been increasing
over the years. The state’s alleged interest has failed, proving that the
ban on same-sex marriage has done very little, if anything, to channel
opposite-sex couples into marriage due to their unintentional
procreation.313
308

Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663. It's been estimated that more than 200,000
American children (some 3,000 in Indiana and about the same number in Wisconsin)
are being raised by homosexuals, mainly homosexual couples. Gary J. Gates,
“LGBT Parenting in the United States” 3 (Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law,
Feb. 2013), http:// williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbtparenting.pdf; Gates, “Same–Sex Couples in Indiana: A Demographic Summary”
(Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2014),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/IN-same-sex-couplesdemo-aug-2014.pdf; Gates, “Same–Sex Couples in Wisconsin: A Demographic
Survey” (Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, Aug. 2014),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp–content/uploads/WI–same–sex–couples–
demo–aug–2014.pdf)).
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663.
312
Id. at 663-64.
313
Id.
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The court's disdain for the defendants’ arguments extended to
Wisconsin as the court analyzed the constitutionality of Article XIII, §
13. 314 Wisconsin argued that: (1) same-sex marriage bans are valid
because per tradition, same-sex couples have not been allowed to
marry; (2) the consequences of same-sex marriage cannot be foreseen;
(3) the right to same-sex marriage should be left to the democratic
process; and (4) same-sex marriage makes marriage fragile and
unreliable. 315
Judge Posner found that tradition “cannot be a lawful ground
for discrimination—regardless of the age of the tradition.”316 Judge
Posner paralleled Judge Crabb’s opinion in Wolf.317 Further, Judge
Posner found that had the Supreme Court in Loving decided to rely on
the tradition of forbidding black-white marriage, which dated back to
colonial times, then the case would have never been resolved the way
it was.318 Although some traditions are harmless, like the president
pardoning a Thanksgiving turkey, or like men shaking hands, “[i]f no
social benefit is conferred by a tradition and it is written into
law and it discriminates against a number of people and does them

314

Wallace, supra note 161, at 347.
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 666.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
Id. at 666-67 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967)).
Wisconsin's argument that its civil union statute remedies the problem met a similar
fate, as the court analogized such a system to interracial marriage: “So look what the
state has done: it has thrown a crumb to same-sex couples, denying them not only
many of the rights and many of the benefits of marriage but also of course the name.
Imagine if in the 1960s the states that forbade interracial marriage had said to
interracial couples: ‘you can have domestic partnerships that create the identical
rights and obligations of marriage, but you can call them only ‘civil unions' or
‘domestic partnerships.’ The term ‘marriage’ is reserved for same-race unions.' This
would give interracial couples much more than Wisconsin's domestic partnership
statute gives same-sex couples. Yet withholding the term ‘marriage’ would be
considered deeply offensive, and, having no justification other than bigotry, would
be invalidated as a denial of equal protection.” Id. at 670.
315
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harm beyond just offending them, it is not just a harmless
anachronism; it is a violation of the equal protection clause.”319
While Wisconsin argued that the judiciary, as well as the state,
should proceed with caution and “go slow” before “transforming this
cornerstone of civilization and society,” Judge Posner found no reason
or evidence that allowing same-sex marriage would transform
marriage.320 Judge Posner found that states have allowed for same-sex
marriage for over a decade now, and there have been no discernable
consequences of “transforming” marriage.321 Further, no studies seem
to indicate that allowing same-sex marriage has any effect on
opposite-sex marriage, and although no one knows for sure how many
Americans identify as LGBT, most estimates vary from one and a half
to four percent of the population—hardly statistically important,
enough to transform marriage.322 Judge Posner also reasoned that that
every court decision is speculative in that no judge has the ability to
determine with certainty the effect a decision will have on the future
but that is what the democratic process protects against.323
Judge Posner found civil unions as a “slap to the face” to gays
and lesbians across Wisconsin, The “Wisconsin legislature . . . finds
that the legal status of domestic partnership as established in this
chapter is not substantially similar to that of marriage.”324 In Judge
Posner’s view, not only is same-sex marriage not allowed, but
Wisconsin explicitly states that civil unions are not adequate
substitutes or comparables to marriage.325 To Judge Posner, that is the
equivalent of “separate but not equal” and finds this reasoning to be
completely arbitrary considering that Wisconsin does not even permit
couples in domestic partnerships to adopt as one unit.326 Crating a
318

Id.
Id. at 668.
321
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 670.
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Id. at 671.
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second-class marriage treats the citizens who participate in it as
second-class citizens.327 These differences cause substantial harm by
invalidating the union of a same-sex couple while also hurting them
and their children financially by refusing them the various state and
federal benefits.328
Wisconsin argued that it is dependent upon the democratic
process to determine whether same-sex marriage should be allowed—
not the judiciary.329 Judge Posner struck that argument down by
stating that homosexuals make up a small percentage of the
population, and thus they are unable to vote strongly enough to enact
change in the issues that they care for.330 As an important corollary to
minority groups with the inability to influence the democratic process,
their recourse has always been in the courts--“the recourse is called
constitutional law.”331
Judge Posner sets forth that the legal standard is explicitly
found in the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor; “[t]he federal
statute is invalid [referring to DOMA], for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity.” 332 The standard of constitutional review is certainly
something more than rational basis review, although Judge Posner did
not feel the need to name the standard as such. Instead, Judge Posner
left us with what he calls “rational basis.” He argued that although he
gave us a “sneak peak” of how heightened scrutiny could be applied
but this case was easier to analyze because Indiana and Wisconsin’s
arguments were so tenuous and unsubstantiated, that they failed even
with the more deferential standard, rational basis review.333
327
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Considered as a whole, Indiana and Wisconsin’s justifications for the
marriage bans have no “fit” and no resemblance to the arguments they
set forth for why marriage should only be limited to opposite-sex
couples.334 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld the decisions of the
district courts and allows for marriage equality in Indiana and
Wisconsin.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision definitively answered that
same-sex marriage bans are impermissible under the law because they
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Although the court
addressed the case under a rubric of rational basis review, built into
the decision is extensive development and discussion about heightened
scrutiny as a standard of constitutional review for sexual orientation.335
Judge Posner called it “rational basis review” but analyzed it as if it
was heightened scrutiny.336 His actions are akin to what the Supreme
Court has done so many times before, as in the cases of Romer,
Lawrence, and Windsor. It appears that by leaving the test undefined,
the courts might purposefully be leaving the possibility for broad legal
arguments and understandings in subsequent litigation in the future.
Even when the courts have failed define the standard, lower courts
have swiftly reacted by using the “spirit” of the decision, to extend
more civil liberties for the LGBT community, even if the explicitly
articulated legal rationale was lacking.
Arguably, the Seventh Circuit was more flagrant by explicitly
stating that under a regime of rational basis the Indiana and Wisconsin
claims would fail. But at the same time, the Seventh Circuit counter
argued itself and struck down arguments within the context of
heightened scrutiny. Judge Posner clearly laid the foundational
arguments as if hypothetically addressing the problem under
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heightened scrutiny.337 Looking forward, in situations where the
challenged action discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, the
Seventh Circuit provided fodder that state restrictions will need more
than a deferential, rational basis to overcome when called into
question. In many respects, this also mirrors the fact that Illinois has
sexual orientation as a suspect class, while Indiana and Wisconsin do
not. The Seventh Circuit’s decision allows for Illinois to continue
having a higher standard of review, while also forcing Wisconsin and
Indiana to recognize that sexual orientation, although not protected by
statute, is protected judicially.
Outside the context of challenges that fall within the realm of
same-sex marriage, this continued weak application of sexual
orientation not explicitly being a constitutionally protected class
deserving of heightened scrutiny could prove problematic. Depending
on where the challenges arise, Indiana, Illinois, or Wisconsin, and
what the area of the law the challenge touches upon can mean that
inconsistent rulings could result. For example, how will lower courts
or the Seventh Circuit court decide cases involving discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in the work place? Although Illinois
protects sexual orientation, Indiana does not. A defendant-employer
could argue that there was no discrimination based on his employee’s
sexual orientation and use Windsor or Baskin to support that there is a
limited finding that sexual orientation deserves more protection, but
only in same-sex marriage cases, not employment cases. Along the
same lines, employers could argue that rational basis review is the
standard that the courts explicitly used, and that is the standard that
should be applied in the employment situation. A plaintiff-employee
would not even be able to rely on a sex discrimination argument
because the courts have explicitly rejected that claim. Despite how
groundbreaking and progressive the Seventh Circuit’s decision was it
does not take long before loopholes can be discovered.
Consider another rising issue that can prove problematic for
the continued development of LGBT civil liberties. As soon as the
Seventh Circuit struck down the same-sex marriage bans in Indiana,
337
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many within the public became outraged, feeling that their religious
views have been accosted.
Backtracking a little bit, the Religious Freedom Restoration
338
Act (RFRA) was passed by Congress and signed by President Bill
Clinton in 1993. The Act was passed directly in response to the
Supreme Court case of Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of the State
of Or. v. Smith.339 There, the Court held that the state could infringe
upon religious expression without violating the First Amendment, so
long as the state’s restriction or regulation was a neutral law of general
applicability.340 Finding this an assault of the state on one of the most
important constitutional right, RFRA was passed to ensure that
religious exercise protections were viable and strong by requiring
challenges to be analyzed using strict scrutiny.341 RFRA was then
declared unconstitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores342 and
inapplicable against the states.343 Regardless, states responded to
Boerne, by passing their own state Religious Freedom Restoration
Acts. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Burnwell v. Hobby
Lobby344, decided a few days after Baskin, held that closely held
corporations can be exempted from following a challenged statute, if
in doing so, would substantially infringe upon the corporation’s
religious exercise.345
Many believe that the effect of cases like Hobby Lobby,
legislation like RFRA, the “mini-RFRA’s” and with states like Indiana
passing even stronger “mini-RFRAs”, will eradicate the achievements
338
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of marriage equality because it will continue discrimination against the
LGBT community.
On its face, what this type of legislation does is that it provides
stronger precedent for more constitutional protections for the free
exercise of religion. It simply sets the standard that courts must use
when analyzing whether certain statutes infringe upon religious
exercise under strict scrutiny. The correlation with LGBT civil
liberties is this: hypothetically speaking, in a situation where a
challenged action asks the court to balance the right to the free
exercise of religious against the right to be free of sexual orientation
discrimination, courts would have to work harder to find for the gay
individual because there is less precedent and law in protecting
discrimination than there is for religious exercise. Said another way, if
religious exercise must be evaluated using strict scrutiny, while on the
other hand, sexual orientation must be evaluated under rational basis
review, arguably heightened scrutiny, it becomes very hard to
determine what the balance is between the two and who ultimately
prevails.
Of course there are certainly serious concerns for what the
future may hold in terms of the development of LGBT rights. But
what we have seen in the last twenty-five years is a nation that has
completely flipped its position from anti-gay to being an ally. What
we are approaching is a definitive end to the debate of whether samesex marriage will destroy the institution of marriage. The nation has
accepted that same-sex marriage will only enrich the lives of those
who enter the institution but it will also create a more stable future for
their children. The stage is set for courts and the legislatures to fill in
the gaps, to set and define the applicable legal standards. Courts and
the legislatures need to fill in the gaps of the constitutional meaning
and precedential significance of all that the last twenty-five years of
jurisprudence has created. Marriage equality is a wonderful first step
in achieving a more inclusive and accepting society, but there is still
work that needs to be done in determining where gays and lesbians fit
on the legal spectrum outside of the context of same-sex marriage.
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